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Leadership Transition in Timor-Leste: 
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After over a year of speculation about government 
reshuffle and leadership succession, Timorese 
resistance hero Xanana Gusmão (popularly known 
by his nom de guerre, Xanana) finally resigned his 
prime minister post in February 2015, succeeded 
by opposition FRETILIN member, Dr Rui Maria 
de Araújo. While Timor-Leste was consumed by 
the questions of reshuffle and leadership transition, 
the country’s giant neighbour and former occupier, 
Indonesia, has been preoccupied with ‘post-
transitional’ issues in the first few months of 
Indonesia’s new government under President Joko 
Widodo ‘Jokowi.’
While Indonesia and Timor-Leste are two distinct 
countries, the interesting recent experience in 
Indonesia does offer some valuable lessons for Timor-
Leste, particularly as the country embarks on the 
very important course of leadership transition. This 
important point of reference, however, largely escapes 
scholarship attention on Timor-Leste (Nygaard-
Christensen 2013; Peake et al. 2014). Jokowi’s recent 
political manoeuvres and challenges offer valuable 
lessons on navigation of delicate politics of political 
supporters and opposition; winning and losing 
political support; and that personal popularity, 
integrity and professionalism on their own are an 
inadequate political seal. Some resemblances in 
political realities of the two countries mean that Rui 
Araújo can benefit from Jokowi’s experience.
The ‘Jokowi Phenomenon’
President Jokowi is known for his popular ‘blusukan’ 
visits.1 This leadership style and his personal 
characteristics helped his election as governor of 
Indonesia’s capital. He was a candidate at both the 
elections for mayor of Solo and governor of Jakarta 
under the flag of PDI Perjuangan (PDI-P),2 led by 
influential Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of 
Indonesia’s founding father, President Soekarno. The 
same party fielded him as presidential candidate at the 
2014 elections, partly thanks to his popularity among 
Indonesian voters.
The beginning of Jokowi’s presidency, however, 
has been marked by serious political challenges. His 
indecisiveness on nomination of a new police chief 
and deterioration in relations between police and the 
anti-graft commission, for instance, exacerbated criti-
cism of his susceptibility to party politics. Observers 
dubbed this reputational challenge as Jokowi’s ‘real 
political test’, while his critics refresh the pre-election 
labels of presiden boneka3 and petugas partai.4
Timor-Leste’s Leadership Transition
When the resignation of Xanana was first made 
public, a number of names were floated as his possible 
successor. These included Agio Pereira, a senior 
member of Gusmão’s CNRT party; Dionisio Babo 
Soares, the secretary-general of CNRT; and Fernando 
de Araújo ‘Lasama’, head of the second-biggest ruling 
coalition partner, the Democratic Party. The fourth 
name was Rui Araújo, a former minister for health 
and Central Committee member of the opposition 
party FRETILIN. All four belong to the so-called 
Timorese ‘new generation’; post-1975 leaders, thus any 
one of them taking over marked leadership transition 
to the new generation.
In his letter of resignation, Xanana explained 
that his decision was intended to pave the way for 
leadership transition. He announced that his choice 
‘falls upon Rui Araújo’5 as his successor, arguing 
he ‘could not find within the coalition government 
one person with the theoretical, technical and 
professional preparation who could guarantee, as 
head of government, “the Government’s stability” 
that is necessary for this transition.’6 Two political 
reasons make Rui Araújo’s nomination interesting: he 
does not belong to the ruling coalition and, though 
a senior member, he is not a holder of high office in 
FRETILIN.
Post-2012 ‘Political Love Affairs’
The nomination of Rui Araújo to succeed Xanana has 
not surprised many in Timor-Leste, not least because 
of the familiarity with his professionalism, integrity 
and incorruptible characteristics. What is surprising, 
though, is Xanana’s ‘honesty’ in saying he could not 
find anyone within his coalition to succeed him. 
Since it is now known that Xanana had contemplated 
his resignation as early as 2011, his appraisal of the 
possible successor within the new generation would 
have started quite soon after, or even earlier.
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In the wake of the 2012 general elections, the two 
biggest political forces of the country have come to 
forge a partnership that was inconceivable even just 
before the elections. Given the history, the so-called 
‘FRETILIN–CNRT love affairs’ or ‘Xanana–Alkatiri 
political romance’ would have been made possible 
only by critical interests the two have in common. 
Leadership transition is one such important interest.
Not surprisingly, Xanana’s political moves, 
including on his successor, have alienated some within 
his ruling coalition, even instigating resistance. It 
appears some members found it difficult to accept 
that Xanana overlooked them as successor and, worse 
still, that he chose someone from the opposition 
party. Constitutionally, however, the prime minister’s 
resignation marks the dissolution of the entire 
government. Consequently, their voice on Xanana’s 
successor is irrelevant, unless of course if asked by 
Xanana and CNRT.
Stepping into Shoes of the ’75 Generation
Stepping into Xanana’s shoes is not an easy 
undertaking. In this sense Rui Araújo’s acceptance 
of the nomination is a daring decision that deserves 
admiration. Given the political stature of Xanana, it 
would be fair to expect that Rui Araújo might struggle 
to cope with high public expectations. In light of the 
time frame before the next general elections, the prime 
ministership will prove to be an enormously difficult 
task. He is also likely to encounter resistance from 
some who vied his appointment in the new cabinet. 
Not least important is all governance problems the 
government inherits. It is unavoidable that, given the 
nature of his nomination, Rui Araújo could be labelled 
a ‘petugas Xanana’7 as he negotiates his way through 
the politics of the new government.8
There is no doubt about Rui Araújo’s competency 
for the post he now occupies. One thing he is yet 
to be fully tested in, however, is politics. His self-
acknowledged lack of political experience makes the 
recent lessons from Indonesia all the more valuable 
as he is likely to be prone to political influence. When 
he accepted to serve as health minister in the first 
post-independence government led by FRETILIN, Rui 
Araújo was not a formal member of the ruling party. 
Yet he managed to fend off political intervention from 
then–prime minister Mari Alkatiri — the influential 
secretary-general of FRETILIN. The challenge he will 
now face as prime minister is obviously of a different 
magnitude, but it is not impossible that he can manage 
this again.
The two biggest political forces of Timor-Leste 
and all the living founding fathers of the country 
share an interest in having a well-managed leadership 
transition. If Rui Araújo fails to modify the shoes 
that Timor-Leste’s ’75 generation left to fit for the 
succeeding generations, it will go down in history as 
the failure of Xanana and FRETILIN too. After all, 
Rui Araújo’s prime ministership is a crucial test to the 
management of Timor-Leste’s leadership transition. 
But as Jokowi’s experience in Indonesia shows, 
management of political influence is equally important 
to that of personal competency and integrity for Rui 
Araújo to succeed.
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Endnotes
1 Visiting places where nobody wants to go to meet and 
talk to people.
2 Indonesian Democratic Party — Struggle.
3 Puppet president.
4 Derived from a Megawati statement at the 
announcement of Jokowi’s candidacy and interpreted 
as a ‘courier of PDI-P who should implement the 
party’s mandates’.
5 Xanana’s letter of resignation to President Taur Matan 
Ruak, 5 February 2015.
6 Xanana’s letter to leaders of ruling coalition parties 
informing his resignation, 5 February 2015.
7 A ‘courier’ of Xanana, obliged to implement mandates 
given by Xanana, echoing Jokowi’s label in Indonesia.
8 Rui Araújo was chosen by Xanana to succeed him, 
a subject of discussion as the constitution of Timor-
Leste does not recognise the notion of succession.
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